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Executive  Summary
At the core of the debt sustainability analysis is the demand for real monetary base, the
primary fiscal surplus, the real interest rate, and the rate of income growth, all of which
are mutually determined by other variables. This paper puts special emphasis on one
such  variable virtually disregarded in current literature on debt sustainabiity - the
demand for monetary base.  Any effort by policymakers to instill confidence in such a way
as to secure an increased demand for the monetary base would be a step forward to
solving the debt dilemma.
Given a constant base multiplier, the demand for real base money (or high-powered
money) goes hand in hand with the demand for money. In fact, if we adjust the stock of
money for changes in the base multiplier, shifts in the former will mirror changes in base
money;  and anything that changes the demand for money will also change the demand for
base money.  This is a basic matter of arithmetic. Consequently, a change in the expected
cost of holding money, a change in wealth (or permanent real income), or a change in
regime - which would no doubt affect the demand for real money - would also affect
the real stock of base money.
In this sense financial deepening would go hand in hand with real high-powered money,
increasing the amount of debt that is sustainable. This is explained by the fact that as
financial deepening increases the real base, it would simultaneously increase seignorage.
Even correctly assuming that the multipliers are not constant 2, there is evidence that there
is a stable demand for high-powered money. In fact, high-powered money competes with
other conventional measures of money (Ml, M2...Mn) regarding its relative stability, and
1 This  paper  was  motivated  by  Guillermo  Perry,  whom  I thank  for  his  excellent  suggestions.  I would  also
like to thank Saul  Lizondo  for his extensive  and valuable  comments  and the research  assistantship
of Beatriz  Alonzo. Naturally, I am solely  responsible  for the opinions  expressed  and any possible
errors. The findings,  interpretations  and conclusions  expressed  are those of the author  and should
not in any manner  be attributed  to the World Bank  or its affiliated  institutions.
2 The multipliers  can in fact depict high  variability  and significant  trend;  their most important
determinants  are the cash-to-deposit  ratio and the reserve  requirements  ratio. In normal circumstances,
the annual average  cash-to-deposit  ratio tends to change  gradually,  and (unfortunately)  as a general rule,
it has  been the reserve  requirements  ratio which  has  been most widely  changed  by policymakers.may even be a "better" definition of money.  The problem with conventional definitions
of money is that their empirical determinants are different, according to the degree of
"moneyness" of its components.
These problems led James Lothian (1976) to focus on the demand for monetary base:
"The solution that Ipropose...  is to return to a narrower definition of money, high-
powered money alone.... The demandfor high-powered money should be more stable
than the demandfor  other monetary aggregates.... I test this proposition by analyzing the
demandfunctions for high-powered money andfor  various other monetary assets
estimated across an international time-section sample spanning forty countries in the
postwar period....  Ifind  that high-powered money is unambiguously the most stable total
across countries in my  sample. "
High interest rates on domestic debt are also an issue of concern. Many Latin American
countries are switching to (domestic) debt financing as a means of  sterilizing the effect
of capital inflows on the real exchange rate. Yet, this trend may, in turn, affect the
sustainability of their debt through its impact on the real interest rate and reduced income
growth (because high interest rates depress economic activity). Its ramifications may also
extend to the demand for real base if the induced higher operational deficit generates
inflationary expectations.
Primary fiscal surplus is a key variable in the calculation of sustainability. A permanent
increase in the primary fiscal surplus would increase debt sustainability if other variables
remain unchanged.  Furthermore, a permanent increase in the fiscal primary surplus
through expenditure reduction would have an important effect on debt sustainability
given its tendency  to:
*  reduce the real interest rate (through crowding out reduction)
*  increase income growth (through increased efficiency in resource allocation and
reduced interest rates)
*  increase the demand for monetary base (as a result of reduced inflationary
expectations).
Most countries in search of fiscal solvency have stressed increased taxation while doing
little to reduce expenditures. However, higher tax revenues have frequently led to higher
expenditures.  In fact,  the general trend in the Western World has been to increase
expenditures which has been blamed for increasing the fiscal gap in the industrial
countries 3. The increase has indeed been striking: from 1960 through 1994 the ratio of
government expenditures to GDP in these countries rose to 50 percent from its previous
28 percent, while tax revenues increased from 28 to 44 percent.
3 On this issue, see Lindauer, (1988); McDermott and Wescott (1996).
2The issue is important given the fact that changes in tax revenues or in government
expenditures have different effects on the real economy. Even equal increments in tax
revenues and expenditure would have a non-neutral effect according to conventional
(text-book) analysis of the balance budget multiplier 4. For example, in a full employment
situation a balance budget multiplier would lead to increments in interest rates.
Consequently, in adjusting the fiscal accounts to achieve debt sustainability, the
composition of the fiscal adjustment would be a critical variable.
4The  balance  budget  multiplier  would be smaller  (instead  of the text-book  case of one) if the public
substitutes  the incremental  public  expenditures  in goods and services  with a reduction  in its
expenditure.  If substitution  is perfect  the balance  budget  multiplier  would  be zero (Bailey 1971).
3Public Debt Sustainability and Demand for Monetary Base
The growing interest in debt sustainability is traced to distinct world experiences with
domestic and external debt defaults or quasi-defaults, at times coupled with banking
crises and the threat of economic collapse.
One face of change in a country's international position can be gauged by the current
account deficit - a measurement of the net capital inflows from abroad.  The aftermath
of the 1994 -95 Mexican meltdown inspired a flood of literature discussing the
sustainability of current account deficits.  Another such face of change is the fiscal deficit
- a measurement of the increment in government borrowing  (including interest and
non-interest bearing debt).
This paper will deal with the latter issue - the sustainability of public debt.  This has
been a matter of great interest as a result of the myriad episodes of quasi-defaults, which
include the relatively recent Latin American debt crises, triggered in 1982 by the Mexican
default, and later the Argentine (1990) and Brazilian  (1991) episodes.
Public debt can be defined as stock resulting from the accumulation of the flow of public
sector deficits.  The  sustainability of  this stock has been discussed in economic literature
in the context of government inter-temporal budgetary constraints: looking at the flow of
future fiscal primary surpluses, the expected real interest rate, etc.
Governments have two ways of complying with  budget constraints - issuing money or
debt 5. In this context, the Treasury would be solvent if the present value of future
primary surpluses (excluding interest payments) equals the stock of its outstanding debt
(Hamilton and Flavin 1986; Caporale 1993). A sufficient condition for solvency is that
the debt to income ratio be less or equal to the present value of primary surpluses, with
the discount factor equal to the real interest rate, minus the rate of real income growth.  It
is not enough to look at the trend of  debt to income ratio; the critical factor is whether
there will be a convergence to a  steady state.
In the former test, the discount factor is the (expected) real interest rate, while in the
latter the discount factor is the difference between the (expected) real interest rate and the
(expected) income growth.  If this present value is equal or higher than the current debt to
GDP ratio, the debt is assumed to be sustainable.
A distinction is sometimes made between government solvency and fiscal sustainability
(Home 1991).  This distinction is important because the government solvency criteria is
broader: it takes into account the government's net worth.  A government is solvent if  it
has a positive net worth: the discounted value of its overall income flowing from all its
assets, minus its total expenditure flow, is positive. Ex-ante a government may be
5In  a strict sense  everything  is debt. Money  is only a special  kind  of non-interest  bearing  debt.
4bankrupt, but ex-post it will be able to pay its debts via debt default or higher direct or
indirect taxation (inflation tax).
A narrower criteria when assessing debt convergence would only consider the economic
situation of the government's  Treasury. Naturally, given these definitions and assuming
positive income growth, a sufficient condition for the sustainability of  the Treasury's
debt would entail that it generate a permanent stream of  positive operational 6 surpluses.
The most utilized variables in assessing debt sustainability are the fiscal primary surplus,
real interest rate and the rate of  GDP growth.  Within this set we could focus on the
Treasury and evaluate, for example, the projected level of government revenues' relative
to its debt burden. The evaluation of the financial and economic capacity of the Treasury
should be no different than that of a private enterprise.  For example, the ratio of debt and
debt service to public savings could be a good indicator of the fiscal burden of the debt.
There are several formulas to quantify debt sustainability, although most are based on
different variants of  governmnent  budget constraints.  Ghani and  Zang (1995), following
Branson (1990), use the following formula to assess debt sustainability in Ethiopia:
db = (r - n) b + p - s
where b is the ratio of debt to GDP, db is its rate of growth, r is the real interest rate, n the
growth rate of real GDP, p is the primary deficit (ratio to GDP), and s is the ratio of
seignorage (including inflation tax) to GDP.  In this formula different assumptions are
made for the time path of  primary surplus, seignorage, interest rate and income growth in
order to map the change in debt, as well as to determine whether it is sustainable through
the usual present value technique.
Privatization
Many governments in LAC have launched ambitious privatization programs. Particularly
important have been those of Chile, Bolivia, Argentina and Peru.  Although Brazil's
program has been relatively slow, it has already managed to sell assets valued near $5 bn,
and is in the process of accelerating its divestiture program with the privatization of the
giant Compania do Vale do Rio Doce.  Mexico and Venezuela have also made significant
strides in this direction. The lingering question, however, is how to treat the privatization
proceedings in the context of debt sustainability.
Privatization can have a significant effect on debt sustainability if  proceeds from the sale
of insolvent public enterprises are applied to pay off  public debt, and inasmuch as these
privatized entities will be a new source of  tax revenue.  Privatization improves the
6The  operational  surplus  is equal  to the primary  surplus, minus  the real component  of interests  payments.
7There  are other  variables  that sometimes  are used to refine  projections,  like  expected  seignorage,
privatization  proceeds  etc.
5Treasury's net worth if the following conditions are met:  the sale value of the public
enterprise, plus the present value of future taxes from the latter, minus government
expenditures to put the enterprise on the market exceeds the present value of future losses
(if not privatized).
Conversely, privatization may have no effect on debt sustainability.  If the enterprise was
profitable and the net income flowing from the stock to be privatized was included in the
fiscal primary balance, there would be no difference in the debt sustainability exercise if
that income flow is reduced,  but the proceeds from privatization are used to reduce the
stock of debt 8.
For most countries the flow of income from public sector enterprises is not included in
Treasury revenue flows. Many of these enterprises either generate losses or their profits
accrue only to the enterprise 9.
Debt: gross or net?
Another issue is the correct measurement of debt.  For example, if the central bank issues
debt in order to sterilize capital inflows, should there be any change in relevant debt
statistics?  What if debt is issued to buy a non-financial asset?  This is not a minor issue.
Country after country in Latin America, in one way or another, has issued a significant
amount of debt in order to sterilize capital inflows.  Brazil and Chile are prime examples,
engaging in zealous sterilization practices.
In the case of foreign exchange purchases, an advisable approach would be to deduct
them from  gross debt, given that in the primary surplus, interest earned on those reserves
is ignored. Non-financial assets are different.  They could  be useful when assessing
government solvency but would complicate matters if net out in the debt sustainability
exercise.
Moreover, implicating non-financial assets may muddle calculations.  There are instances
in which it may be difficult to value the asset counterpart of debt. For example, the
central bank grants a rediscount to troubled  banks, assumes a portion of the latter's assets
as a guarantee, and sterilizes the monetary effect by issuing debt.  Should this debt
increment be offset by the seizure of commercial  bank assets?  What percentage of the
rediscount would be paid back?  In this example, the difficulty comes from the lack of
indicators of the market value of  commercial bank assets seized by the central bank.
Regarding the use of net or gross figures for debt analysis, a distinction should be drawn
between financial and non-financial assets.
8 Given  the interest  rates,  any stock  can be converted  into a flow  and vice-versa.
9A  classic  counterexample  would  be Venezuela  where  a large  share of PDVESA  profits  go to the
government  coffers. This is not the usual case in Latin  America.
6Standardfinancial  assets  Interest rate earnings on the Treasury's standard financial
assets  should not be included as fiscal revenues, and the stock of those financial assets
should be deducted from the stock of debt. In this sense debt is net of other financial
assets.
Non-financial  assets: These may be different in view of the fact that their return may be
counted as fiscal revenues. If this is the case, the stock value of these non-financial assets
should not be netted-out from the stock of debt.
The most conservative approach to the gross-net debt issue is to net out only standard
financial assets whose returns have been excluded in the fiscal revenues. All other items
should be omitted, including those financial assets taken over from commercial banks.
Contingent  liabilities
The Treasury may have to contend with a host of contingent liabilities;  such as, deposit
insurance of the entire banking system, liabilities belonging to certain government-
managed insolvent banks, social security debt, debt guarantees including  States' debt
guarantee by the federal government, etc.  Some of these liabilities are not contingent but
rather actual short-term net debt; for example, the red ink on commercial banks taken
over and managed by the central bank or a government agency.
How are contingent liabilities accounted for?  One approach would be to confine them to
government solvency estimates and not to debt sustainability.  Another more
conservative option would be to include a small percentage of contingent liabilities as a
part of  Treasury's total debt.
Some  difficulties with primary fiscal  surpluses
The inherent problem in the approach comparing the primary surplus and its present
value with the stock of debt is using the "right" real interest rate, which in turn depends
on the structure of the surpluses. The same fiscal surplus could be consistent with an
infinite path of expenditures and revenues; consequently, the pattern of outlays, savings
and interest rate would differ, even though the deficit is the same.  As Ghani and Zang
aptly put it (1995): "debt sustainability (both domestic and external) is an integral
element of macroeconomic stability. Interactions between different policy  variables
(such as debt, fiscal and interest rate policies), and outcome variables (such ad GDP and
export growth), as well as international economic conditions (international interest rates)
jointly define if the country is on a sustainable debt path."
Under Ricardian'° equivalencies the crucial variable is not the deficit but rather
expenditures.  Public expenditures is the amount of resources that in fact crowd out the
l Although  Ricardian  equivalencies  must stand the test of strict  assumptions,  it does not prevent  it from
shedding  light  on the crucial  role of government  expenditures  relative  to that  of the fiscal  deficit. Ricardian
equivalence  would  hold  true if taxes  were lump  sum,  capital  markets  were perfect  and all individuals  had
operative  altruistic motives. Under  these  assumptions,  for a given  path of expenditures,  debt and tax
7private sector.  How they are financed (debt or taxes) would be, under Ricardian
equivalence, of no real importance regarding real variables.  Market interest rates on
government debt would be less, the lower the government expenditures.  This would be
true even if lower expenditures were coupled with a higher debt-financed deficit. The
level of government spending might be a crucial variable in determining debt
sustainability (through its impact on interest rates).
In this regard, a country could find that a smaller primary surplus, produced by a more
than proportional fall in the tax burden over expenditures, may actually make its debt
sustainable if the impact of reduced expenditures on real interest rates is large enough.  In
this sense, more empirical research on the effect of government expenditure on interest
rates would be essential.
The current real interest on government debt provides a valuable summary indicator of
market expectations regarding fiscal solvency. Different  time structures of  government
debt and varied debt indexations (including indexing to the exchange rate) can affect the
real interest rates on the debt insofar as the indexation rule affects the fiscal position of
the government, and the market perceives a different probability of default for different
types of debt in the government's debt menu.  In this sense, and to a limited extent, some
financial engineering may be able to change some of the real conditions of public debt.
The current observed interest rate on government bonds may not be representative of the
"long- term equilibrium" rate, due to monetary policy shocks. The central bank may elect
to pursue a temporary "tight" policy; consequently, the interest rate may not necessarily
reflect its long-term "permanent" value for the nation's given set of economic parameters.
Furthermore, the government's  "risk premium" may be affected by short-term forces.
Naturally, if  central banks follow a "tight" monetary policy long enough, this could turn
the current interest rate into a relevant figure in the calculation of  sustainability.
The lower the probability that debt will be sustainable, the higher the interest rates and
the shorter its time-structure.  In other words, the higher the interest rate, the higher the
probability that debt will be unsustainable. If the latter is the case, the market will take
for  granted that in time government will redefine its fiscal policy - either increasing
taxes, reducing expenditures, repudiating debt or increasing the inflation tax.
The long-run "equilibrium"  interest rate on government debt is an estimate of the
likelihood of the expected value of future primary surpluses to equal the current stock of
debt.  The observed market interest rate is made up of the basic risk-free equilibrium rate,
plus "government" risk (including the probability of default), plus (or minus) temporary
shocks.
finance  would  be equivalent.  In the words  of Obstfeld  and Rogoff  (1996)  "...Given  the path of govemment
spending,  a transfer  of foreign  assets  from a country's  private  sector  to its government,  say, would  cause
tax cuts  just sufficient  to leave  the present  value  of private  disposable  income  unchanged."
8Given all the conceptual and empirical problems with the "right" measurement of  debt,
interest rates, and  fiscal revenues and expenditures, an adequate empirical assessment of
debt sustainability would include the market value of debt (assuming there is a secondary
market)".  The market value of government debt is equal to the present value of the share
of expectedfiscal  surplus that is expected to be applied to debt amortization.
Consequently, a rule of thumb in assessing sustainability, is that if the market value of the
Treasury's  debt is lower than the present value of promised interest payments (plus
principal), the face value of debt is unsustainable.  The difference between the market
value and the face value is the measurement of tax (including partial default) that has not
been explicitly "budgeted."
Income Velocity of  Base Money and the Debt-Inflation Choice
Although this paper takes into account seignorage and the inflation tax as a source of
revenue when defining the budget constraint, it has yet to emphasize the importance of
income velocity of base money in a country's choice between debt and inflation. Income
velocity  plays a crucial role in the inflationary (deflationary) impact of debt vis-a-vis
monetary financing of the primary deficit.
We define:
i  nominal interest rate
y  real income
B  stock of bonds outstanding
H  monetary base
P  price level
E  public sector non-interest expenditures
R  public sector non-interest revenues
PSBR = E-R + iB  ( public sector borrowing requirements)
D = PSBR - iB  (Primary balance, deficit when positive;  a surplus when negative)
OD = D + rB  (Operational balance)
k = 1/V  ratio of monetary base to GDP
Z  denotes increment
g  preceding a variable denotes its rate of change
lower case letter refer to ratios to GDP
r = ((1+i)/(1+gP)) (-1) real rate of interest
(1)  D=  E-R
(2)  D+iB=ZB+ZH  (PSBR)
This in fact is the same  as looking  at the market  interest  rate on such debt .
9Dividing (2) by GDP, dividing and multiplying ZB by B and  ZH by H and assuming
gP=gH - gy,  results in:
(3)  d+ib=bgB+kgP+kgy
(4)  gP = Vd + Vb i - Vb gB - gy
(5)  gP = Vd + Vb (i - gB) - gy
defining the public sector borrowing requirements as ps = d + bi,
and  the real increment in government bonds as  (ZB/Y) = zB,
we obtain from (5):
(6)  gP=  Vps-VzB-gy
(7)  gP =  V (ps -zB) - gy
Equation (7) shows two important features: (1) two countries with the same ratio of
public sector borrowing requirements to GDP (ps) may have a completely different
inflation rate, depending on their income velocity of base money; and (2) the higher the
income velocity of base money, the higher the incentive to increase debt (zB).  If zB is
larger than ps, the indication is that the nominal supply of money is being reduced, and
consequently deflation is expected.
Equation (5) expresses the same proposition in a different light:  the impact of bond
financing on inflation is negative if the rate of change in the nominal stock of bonds is
higher than the nominal interest rate.  This situation is consistent with the classical Ponzi
game in which new bonds are issued to pay incurred interest rates. The higher the income
velocity of base money, the greater the temptation to resort to these Ponzi games.
10Debt sustainability
using i= r + gP,  assuming debt sustainability is defined as
gB = gP + gy  and substituting them into (3), we get:
(8)  d+br=kgP+bgy+kgy
(9)  gP = Vd + Vb (r - gy) -gy
re-arranging (9), we obtain:
(10)  gP  = V[d+b(r-gy)]-gy
Equation (10) shows the basic elements of the well-known quantitative theory of money:
inflation depends on velocity (V), money supply (d+rb) and real income growth.
From equation (8) solving for b,  we obtain:
(11)  b=(kgP+kgy-d)/(r-gy)
Equation (11  )shows that, ceteris paribus,  the sustainable debt ratio (b) will be higher, the
greater the inflation rate (due to  the inflation tax) and the greater the income growth.  In
fact  k (gP + gy) measures government revenue from money creation, which is an inverse
function of income velocity of money: the higher the income velocity, the lower the
government revenue from money creation. Also, according to equation (11) a fiscal
surplus (negative d) will have a positive effect on the amount of sustainable debt.
The denominator of equation ( 11) is the difference between the real rate of interest and
the real rate of economic growth. In the "normal" case, the interest rate is higher than the
rate of income growth, but in the opposite case a primary surplus is not needed to achieve
sustainability. The government could run primary deficits of any size which would be
consistent with a sustainable debt ratio (Blanchard et. al. 1990).
The equilibrium value of constant debt (b) will be lower, the lower the primary surplus' 2
and the higher the real interest rate.  Real income growth plays a double role inasmuch as
it is a source of seignorage to government and increases the denominator of the debt ratio.
Seignorage
Seignorage is particularly important and is exhibited in equation (11) as  real base money
(k) multiplied by the rate of inflation and the rate of real income growth.
12  If there is a sustainable  debt figure,  despite  of a primary  deficit,  it is due to the tax revenue  from money
creation.
11Applying equation (11) to  the following "reasonable" 1997 value parameters for Brazil,
we obtain a "reasonable"  b = 0.17
k = .06;  gP = .07;  r= .09;  gy=  .04;  d = -.002 (primary surplus)
Brazil has evidently planned a higher primary surplus for future years.  Consequently, its
sustainable debt could probably be much greater, particularly because higher surpluses
would increase confidence, reduce interest rates and most importantly, increase the
demand for base money (which is at a current chronic low).
Equation (11) assumes a floating exchange rate.  If a country has a fixed exchange rate, a
shift in k will cause a change in international reserves.  In this case an increment in k
would invariably allow the central bank to reduce its net debt, which in turn may reduce
interest rates and have a direct impact on the sustainability of the new debt ratio.
In the floating exchange rate model  an increment in k  that is not more than offset by the
reduction in inflation will increase the sustainability figure. In general, and given
positive income growth, it is quite probable that increments in  k would have a significant
positive impact on the debt sustainability figure.
Equation (9) establishes that the partial effect on inflation, from  changes in the real
interest rate, depends on both the real  stock of bonds and on income velocity of base
money.  The higher the debt already incurred and the higher the income velocity of
base money, the greater the impact on inflation from  a given change in real interest
rates.  Many times  shifts in interest rates affect  income growth. Consequently, a policy
of sterilizing  capital inflows with debt issue may, through an increased interest rate
bill and reduced rate of income growth, raise the rate of inflation"3.
The impact of  b is obvious: the higher the real stock of bonds, the higher  the real
interest bill that must be financed.  Still, the impact of V must also be stressed: the same
interest rate bill will have a different impact on inflation depending on the degree of
financial deepening, as measured by the real quantity of high powered money.
Given the explicit assumptions in equation (9) if, for example, a country were to keep its
stock of bonds constant at 40 percent of  GDP, and assuming a real interest rate of  9
percent, together with a growth rate of  .03, equation (10) would predict the following
inflation rates for alternative values of income velocity (V) and primary balance (d)'4:
3  The dangers  of "excessive"  debt financing  have  been emphasized  in Sargent  -Wallace's (1981)
"unpleasant  arithmetic": a tighter  monetary  policy  today can imply, via higher interest  rate bill, a
higher inflation  tomorrow.
14 It is important  to interpret  the cells in tables I and 2 in relation  to "alternative  country  situation,"  for it
would  be unreasonable  to assume  that velocity  is constant  when inflation  is changing,  or that inflation
is constant  when velocity  is changing.
12Table 1
Inflation rates for given primary balances and income velocity of  base money
Given: b = 0.4;  r = 0.09;  gy = 0.03
V  20  15  10  5
d
.02  110  83  54  26
.01  91  68  44  21
.00  71  53  34  16
-.01  51  38  24  1  1
-.02  31  23  14  7
V is income  velocity  of base money,
d is deficit,  or surplus  when negative
inflation  rates are annual percentages
Table I shows that the same primary deficit (surplus' 5) will be consistent with very
different inflation rates, depending on income velocity of base money.  The inflation
elasticity of the demand for money is crucial in determining the level of sustainable debt,
given its impact on the inflation tax revenue.  A very high elasticity would probably
decrease the sustainable debt for increasing inflation.
Table 1 underscores the importance of both the fiscal stance and the  income velocity of
base money.  For example, if  two countries had similar interest and growth rates and a
velocity of base money of roughly 10, a one percentage point difference in their fiscal
deficit would translate into a 10 percentage point difference in their annual  inflation rate.
The greater the level of velocity, the higher the difference in the inflation rate per
percentage change in the deficit. If these countries had an identical fiscal deficit, say 1
percent of GDP, but one had a base velocity of 15 and the other 5, the former would have
a yearly inflation of about 68 percent, while the latter about 21 percent.
Based on equation (9), which assumes that the real stock of bonds is constant, the
following chart gives the equilibrium value of the real stock of debt for different interest
rates and demand for base money. We assume that a primary surplus (-d) equals 2
percent of GDP and inflation equals 10 percent.
5 A primary  surplus  can also  be consistent  with  an operational  deficit  in which  case we would  also
experience  inflation.
13Table 2
Sustainable Debt for Different Velocities and real interest rates
gP = .l0;  gy = 0.03;  -d = 0.02
(1/V)  1/20  1/15  1/10  1/5
r
.05  .50  .54  .60  .80
.10  .25  .27  .30  .40
.15  .16  .18  .20  .27
.20  .12  .13  .15  .20
Table 1 and 2 call attention to the importance of income velocity of base money. Table 1
shows the importance and inflation effect of the level of income velocity of money. Table
2 shows impact of velocity on sustainable debt given other policy variables.
For two countries having a similar surplus of about 2 percent of GDP and yearly inflation
and growth of about 10 and 3 percent, according to table 2, if one of the countries
experienced a base velocity of 10 and the other 5, the former's  sustainable debt would be
60 percent of GDP, while the latter would represent 80 percent.
The higher the demand for base money (the lower its velocity), the higher the
"sustainable"  real debt for given interest rates.  For example (according to row 2 of Table
2), for a real interest rate of 10 percent per year, the sustainable debt would rise from 25
percent to 40 percent of GDP, as velocity decreases from 20  to 5 per year.
Given velocity, the columns in Table 2 show a significant reaction of the equilibrium of
debt to changes in real interest rates.  For example, if interest rates are reduced by 5
percentage points (from 15 to 10 percent) and velocity is 10, the sustainable debt would
consequently increase 10 percentage points of GDP (from .20 to .30). For the same
interest rate change (same percentage points change) the increment in sustainable debt is
larger, the lower the income velocity of money.
To make the calculation of sustainable debt, it is necessary to consider "reasonable"
values of  parameters. A one or two year "blip" makes no sense when applying these
values to the equations.  Consider, for example, the case of Chile in 1995, with an
income velocity of base money of  3.3, a primary surplus close to 2 percent of  GDP, an
inflation of about 8 percent, and an interest rate of 10 percent per year.  Its sustainable
debt should have been approximately 453  percent of GDP.  The same would apply to
other countries with atypical figures, for example the Mexican 1995 economic statistics.
14Demand for Base Money
Given a constant base multiplier, the demand for real base money, or high-powered
money, goes hand in hand with the demand for money. In fact, if we adjust the stock of
money for changes in the base multiplier, the changes in the money stock will exactly
mirror the changes in base money; and anything that changes the demand for money
would change the demand for base money. This is a matter of arithmetic. Consequently, a
change in the expected cost of holding money, a change in wealth (or permanent real
income). or a change in regime -which would no doubt affect the demand for real money-
would also affect the real stock of base money.
Even assuming, as we should, that the multipliers are not constant, there is evidence that
there is an stable demand for high-powered money. In fact, the monetary base competes
with other conventional measures of money (MI, M2...M4) regarding its relative
stability, and may even be a "better" definition of money. The problem with conventional
definitions of money is that the empirical determinants of the demand for money are
different according to the degree of  "moneyness" of its components.
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1970), "The approach stressing the medium-of-
exchange function of money has the virtue of possessing a fairly clear empirical
counterpart..  .High powered money, not currency plus demand deposits, is the total that
has the ...quality suggested as the relevant criteria."  Friedman did not favor any a priory
definition of money. His criteria was that money was that part of wealth that separated the
act of purchase from the act of sale, and in this sense it was a temporary abode of general
purchasing power and a stable function of few variables (Friedman 1969). In this sense
the monetary base may be as good a definition as MI or M3.
These problems led James Lothian (1976) to focus on the demand for monetary base:
"The solution that Ipropose...  is to return to a narrower definition of money, high-
powered money alone. The rationale is that since high-powered money is of relatively
constant quality over time and space.. specification errors are likely to be less important
for high-powered money than for deposit-inclusive totals.... The demandfor  high-
powered money should be more stable than the demandfor  other monetary aggregates....
I test this proposition by analyzing the demandfunctions for  high-powered money andfor
various other monetary assets estimated across an international time-section sample
spanning forty countries in the postwar period...  Ifind  that high-powered money is
unambiguously the most stable total across the countries in my sample. "
According to Lothian (1976), the obvious implication of his findings in international
studies in which the stability of the demand for money is a key assumption -for example
in the monetary approach to the balance of payments or to exchange rate determination-
is that a simpler definition of money might be very fruitful
Moreover, we have found in this paper that real high-powered money is a key factor in
the debt sustainability exercise.  According to Lothian's analysis, the real base money
would be a stable function of a few variables. The issue has not been settled and recently
15in the United Sates there has been a great deal of discussion regarding  the revised St.
Louis adjusted monetary base'6. Consequently, more research  on this important issue is
warranted particularly for less developed countries since most empirical evidence has
been developed for the United States and some European countries.
Primary fiscal balance: should we increase taxation or reduce expenditures?
There are three channels through which a reduction in government expenditures affect
debt sustainability".
(1) Increment in the primary fiscal surplus (or reduction in the deficit)
(2) Increment in the rate of growth of the economy
(3) Reduction in the real rate of interest
The primary surplus plays a critical role in the debt sustainability analysis. The only
circumstance in which the primary balance would not be important, regarding this issue,
would be if the economy's rate of growth were higher than the real rate of interest' 8. This
is not the usual case.
Most countries in search of fiscal solvency have stressed increased taxation but have done
little to reduce expenditures. Nevertheless, higher tax revenues have frequently led to
higher expenditures.  In fact, the general trend in the Western World has been to increase
expenditures (Lindauer, 1988) which according to McDermott and Wescott (1996) is
responsible for the fiscal gap in industrial countries. The increase has indeed been
striking: from 1960 through 1994 the ratio of govermnent expenditures to GDP in these
countries rose to 50 percent from 28 percent while tax revenues increased from 28
percent to 44 percent.
This is an important issue considering that changes in tax revenues or in government
expenditures have different effects on the real economy. Even equal increments in tax
revenues and expenditure would have a non-neutral effect according to conventional
(text-book) analysis of the balance budget multiplier' 9. For example, in a full employment
situation a balance budget multiplier would lead to increments in interest rates.
Many developing countries, in an effort to achieve macroeconomic stability and to
sharpen their competitive edge, many developing countries have privatized most of their
16 Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Saint  Louis,  Proceedings  of a Symposium  held in March  29, 1996.
November/December  1996,  volume  78, number  6.
17 The first is direct and straightforward;  the other  two indirect  and depend  on other  assumptions.
18 The NPV  of addition  to income  higher  than the NPV of addition  to debt.
19  The balance  budget  multiplier  would be smaller  (instead  of the text-book  case of one) if the public
substitutes  the incremental  public  expenditures  in good and services  with a reduction  in its
expenditure.  If substitution  is perfect  the balance  budget  multiplier  would  be zero (Bailey 1971).
16state-owned enterprises (SOE) and, in this sense, reduced'government expenditures.
Nevertheless, the ratio of consolidated government expenditures (federal, state and
municipal) to GDP does not appear to have been substantially reduced, at least for most
countries in Latin America.
We would expect that if private expenditures in capital formation are more productive
(have a higher rate of return) than government expenditures, a switch from government to
private expenditures would have a positive effect on the economy's rate of growth 20.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) have concluded that the composition of fiscal adjustment is a
highly significant variable to its very sustainability. For 1960-64, industrial OECD
countries whose fiscal adjustment has chiefly relied on government wage bill  and
welfare transfers cuts, have experienced a more lasting fiscal adjustment, and have been
prone to greater growth, than countries that have relied on tax increments and public
investment cuts. Consequently, in adjusting the fiscal accounts to obtain debt
sustainability, the composition of the fiscal adjustment would be a crucial variable.
Regarding interest rates, a reduction in government expenditures would tend  to decrease
rates in as much as a stronger  fiscal stance would reduce the risk associated with the
government bonds.
The standard analysis concludes that an increase in taxation reduces the real interest rate
in so far as desired private savings falls less than the tax increment, so that desired
national savings increase. This shift to the right in the savings schedule would reduce
interest rates and increase investment 2".
There is another school of thought that claims that the pattern of taxation is irrelevant and
that the real effect is given by the pattern of expenditures.  This literature has been
developed in the context of discussing budget deficits, and is based on the Ricardian
theory. This hypothesis claims that what matters to the public is the present value of taxes
and not its financing via debt or taxation. This hypothesis has been revived by Barro
(1979, 1990): "the substitution of a budget deficitfor  current taxes... has no impact on
the aggregate demandfor goods. In this sense budget deficits and taxation have
equivalent effects on the economy-hence the term Ricardian equivalence theorem ". The
Ricardian/Barro analysis tells us that by increasing taxation, without changing
expenditures, nothing has changed, except the government's debt/tax mix .Nothing has
changed because the present value of  future taxes has not changed.
20 There is no reason  to assume  a change  in the private  sector's  marginal  propensity  to save.
21 In this conventional  analysis  a tax cut would  have  the opposite  effect: increase  aggregate  demand  for
consumption  goods,  a reduction  in desired  national  savings  (with  some increment  in desired  private
savings),  and a rise in interest  rates.  In this situation,  the conventional  analysis  alleges  that the fiscal
deficit  produces  a crowding  out effect  due  to the increment  in the interest  rates.
17This matter has yet to be resolved. As Al Harberger allegedly mentioned: "I know of no
one who has canceled his vacation because the government has increased its bond issue,
but I know people who have canceled their vacation because the government increased
taxes ". Yet the empirical evidence seems to tilt in favor of the Ricardo/Barro approach.
A survey of empirical studies on the deficit-interest rate 'found that only four of twenty-
one studies provided evidence supporting a positive, statistically significant impact of
deficits on interest rates....  another ten studies found no evidence .... the remaining seven
studies produced mixed results that also sometimes indicated no link" (Bradly 1986).
Bradley (1986) links interest rate changes to government expenditures: "In this article we
demonstrate that a crucial difference exists between the economic impacts of increased
government spending and the economic impacts of increasing the bond stock  Using a
simple dynamic model, we find that increases in the stock of government bonds, by
themselves, do not force interest rates. When the debt increase is caused by a rise in
spending, however, we find that, after a lag, both interest rates  ...... rise. "
Barro (1990) draws a distinction between temporary and permanent variations in
government purchases, arguing that the interest rate and outputs are mostly affected by
temporary changes in government expenditures.
The issue concerning the impact of government deficit and fiscal policy on interest rates
is far from being resolved. Most of the empirical evidence is inconclusive and pertains
mostly to the US. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that, at least for Latin America,
an increment in the primary surplus would tend to reduce interest rates due to its
contribution to reducing country risk. Also, a reduction of government expenditures, for
example, through privatization of SOEs or reduction in bloated bureaucracies, would help
to (a) increase the rate of income growth (allocation effect) and (b) reduce the interest rate
(crowding out effect).
Description of Some Debt Statistics for Selected Countries
Tlhe  remaining sections will present some variables relevant to the debt sustainability of
Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica, with passing references to Germany and Argentina.
Brazil
Brazil is an interesting country given its broad experience with inflation, debt problems
and  extensive debt-financing strategies. In the previous debt sustainability exercise, we
have demonstrated that k is a key variable.  The following illustration will show the
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Chart 1 shows important fluctuations in the demand for real base money, indicating a
very low average:  roughly 4 percent of GDP.
The following example demonstrates the evolution of total debt (domestic and foreign) as
a ratio  to GDP.  As evidence suggests, a sharp drop was experienced in 1990, proceeded
by  a substantial recovery until 1995, with the exception of 1993 when the ratio sustained
a slight stumble.
19Chart 2
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Brazil has chronically suffered from three related ailments:  lack-luster fiscal
performance, high interest rate on its debt, and high velocity of circulation of money.
Nonetheless, it had one thing in its favor  -a  relatively high rate of growth.
The next two charts demonstrate Brazil's changing strategy  regarding domestic and
foreign debt financing.
20Chart 3
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As the chart indicates, as of 1992 there has been a critical shift in the strategy of
domestic and foreign financing of the primary deficit: domestic debt increased
dramatically from about 5 percent of GDP in 1991 to 26 percent in 1995. This direction
is traced  to the policy of capital inflows sterilization (to avoid exchange rate
appreciation), and to tight monetary policy associated with the "Real Plan."  The switch
in debt management is exhibited in a more striking fashion in the next chart, presenting
the ratio of  domestic debt to foreign debt.
21Chart 4
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Chart 4  shows a significant shift in Brazil's debt management strategy. The average
ratio of domestic to foreign debt for  1985-1992 was about 0.4, and by 1995 climbed to
1.5, signaling an impressive change in the debt mix.
Chile
As a contrast to Brazil's strikingly low demand for real base money and its subsequent
effect on the sustainable debt figure, we consider Chile.  Applying the "reasonable"
values for this nation to equation (11) results in a completely different picture.  While
base velocity in Brazil is about 17 per year, in Chile it is roughly 3.3 per year (k=.3).
For Chile we will assume that velocity will remain the same as its current level, and that
its long-term income growth will be reduced from its likely unsustainable current level to
about 5 percent per year.
k = .30;  gP =.07;  r = .08;  gy = .05;  d =  - 0.01 (primary surplus), with these parameter
values we obtain  b = 1.33
The following chart demonstrates the evolution of k for Chile.
22Chart 5
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Even though Chile has experienced a downward trend in k, its value is still quite high,
translating into high revenues from seignorage.  For example, if we merely  consider the
inflation tax, multiplying the 1995 real stock of base - which was about 30 percent of
GDP-  by the inflation rate of the same year (about 8 percent), the result is an inflation
tax of roughly 2.4 percent of GDP. This is without considering income growth.
Germany
For the sake of comparison with a developed country, we consider Germany, ndassume
a zero primary balance and the following parameters:
gP=.04;  r=.04;  gy=.02;  k=.10
Equation (11) yields in this case a sustainable b = .30
23This value is, without doubt, acutely low.  According to the Maastricht treaty, by 1999
countries wishing to lock into the EMU fixed exchange rate system are requested ( among
other things) to have a debt to GDP ratio smaller than 0.60.  Germany, like Brazil, suffers
from a low k, which implies low revenue from seignorage. Hence, Germany is
compelled to make a greater fiscal adjustment than otherwise would have been the case.
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This diagram shows a substantial variability in  German demand for base money, which
is in fact quite interesting given its strong record of stability.
Costa Rica
Costa Rica is an interesting example of the costly switch from foreign to domestic
financing.  One reason can be traced to the sterilization of capital flows.  From 1989
through 1995 foreign reserves of the Monetary Authorities increased twofold (IFS).
Also, and most importantly, the operational deficit was  4.8 percent of GDP in 1994, 2
percent in 1995 and about 3.2 percent in 1996. This was mainly due to the high cost of
real interest rates, as displayed in the following table:
24Table 5
Costa Rica: Interest Payments, ratios to GDP








Costa Rica: Financing  Operational Deficits
Year  Operational Deficits  %FFinancing  %DDFinancing
1991  9.0  16  47
1994  63.1  10  70
1995  33.8  -22  146
Source:  IMF
Operational  deficit  is in Bn  Colones;  1992  and 1993  experienced  operational  surpluses
Table 6 shows that Costa Rica has been financing a large share of its operational deficit
with domestic debt. Particularly crucial was 1995 in which a share of the increment in
domestic debt was used to reduce foreign borrowing.
Applying some experimental values to equation (9), Costa Rica shows a sustainable debt
of  59 percent of GDP 22.
The following chart depicts the ratio of total debt to GDP and the ratio of Domestic Debt
to GDP.
22gP=.20;  gy=.03;  k.16;  r=.15
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Costa Rica: Total and Domestic Debt
Ratios to GDP
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If we only focus on the total debt to GDP ratio, we are tempted to be optimistic.  True,
the total debt to GDP decreased from 100 percent of GDP in 1985 to about 61 percent in
1995, which approximates the "sustainable" ratio calculated by equation (9).
Nevertheless, this picture is deceiving. First, a large share of the fall in the foreign debt
ratio to GDP is the product of the exchange rate appreciation, which increases dollar
GDP without changing the actual dollar debt figure. Second, the fiscal situation has
deteriorated significantly and interest rates have increased substantially. The primary
1996 surplus of  3.2 percent of GDP could not compensate a large interest rate bill of 6.4
percent of GDP, which  produced an operational deficit of  3.2 percent of GDP.
So far, Costa Rica has had a relatively low income velocity of money (about 6 per year
over M2).  If this were to change, as expected if the fiscal situation does not improve, this
nation would have a proportionally higher level of inflation if it wanted to keep its debt
ratio at "reasonable" levels.
26Chart 8
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27The above cited chart shows  that domestic  debt  increased  from 13  percent in 1985  to
almost 30 percent  of GDP in 1995.
The real interest  rate is a major variable  in all debt sustainability  exercises.  The following
presents  the ratio of the interest  rate bill to the stock  of debt.
Chart 10
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Chart 10 shows that the real interest rate has become a major factor in determining the
probability of sustaining the current stock of debt in Costa Rica. In this chart 1992 and
1993 appear to be outliers. These were  years of operational surpluses, which were
followed by years of significant deficits.
The following illustration exhibits the huge interest rate burden for the Costa Rican
Treasury.  In 1995 interest payments represented almost 20 percent of  Treasury's tax
revenues.
28Chart I 1
Costa Rica:  Ratio of Interest  Payments  to Tax Revenues
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29Argentina
Argentina has had a currency board since 1991. In this endogenous money system, the
demand for  base is important because increments in k imply an increment in the amount
of Central Bank foreign assets.  In this case the Central Bank's seignorage equals the
interest on these international reserves.  Equation (11) cannot be directly applied to a
completely fixed exchange rate system like that of  Argentina, since this equation has the
explicit assumption that the rate of inflation is determined by the exogenous monetary
base.  The following charts present the evolution of Argentina's domestic and foreign
debt, as well as total debt to GDP ratio.
Chart 12
Argentina: Domestic and Foreign Debt
Ratios to GDP
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While Argentina has had a strict, fixed exchange rate system, Brazil, in contrast, has had
what has been referred to as a dirty peg, or sliding band.  And although Argentina has not
mimicked the "sterilization" policy of Brazil, both have experienced a remarkably
similar pattern in the rate of change in their foreign and total indebtedness, as the
following charts will exhibit.
31Chart 14
Argentina and Brazil
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32Chart 15
Argentina and Brazil
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33Conclusions
At the core of the debt sustainability analysis is the demand for real monetary base, the
primary fiscal surplus, the real interest rate, and the rate of income growth, all of which
are mutually determined  by other variables.  This paper puts special emphasis on one
such  variable virtually disregarded in current literature on debt sustainability - the
demand for monetary base.  Any effort by policymakers to instill confidence in such a
way as to secure an increased demand for the monetary base would be a step forward to
solving the debt dilemma.
High interest rates on domestic debt are also an issue of concern. Many Latin American
countries are switching to (domestic) debt  financing as a means of  sterilizing the effect
of capital inflows on the real exchange rate. Yet, this trend may, in turn, affect the
sustainability of their debt through its impact on the real interest rate and reduced income
growth (because high interest rates depress economic activity). Its ramifications may also
extend to the demand for real base if the induced higher operational deficit generates
inflationary expectations.
Primary fiscal surplus is a key variable in the calculation of sustainability. A permanent
increase in the primary fiscal surplus would increase debt sustainability if other variables
remain unchanged.  Furthermore, a permanent increase in the fiscal primary surplus
through expenditure reduction would have an important effect on debt sustainability
given its tendency  to:
*  reduce the real interest rate (through crowding out reduction)
*  increase income growth (through increased efficiency in resource allocation and
reduced interest rates)
*  increase the demand for monetary base (as a result of reduced inflationary
expectations).
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